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In 1998, James Thompson successfully cultivated embryonic stem
cells in a culture dish, helping to further scientific claims that human
embryonic' research could provide the cures for fatal diseases and the
means for cloning.2 Since that day, embryonic research" has become
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; B.A., Pensacola
Christian College, 2000. I dedicate this note to my mother and father for teaching
me the way that I should go and to my husband Andrew for joining me in my
continued journey along that way. Also, I thank Professor Patricia Bellia for her
invaluable comments. Last, I thank the members of the Austin Fellowship for
introducing me to this topic.
1 In this Note, the words "embryo" or "embryonic" refer to human embryos un-
less otherwise noted.
2 See Tim Friend, Human Cells Grown in Lab for First Time, USA TODAY, Nov. 6,
1998, at A].
3 In this Note, "embryonic research" refers to non-therapeutic embryonic re-
search. There are two forms of embryonic research: therapeutic and non-therapeutic.
Alex Mauron, What Developments of Human Embryo Research Would Be Philosophically
Challenging?, in CONCEIVING THE EMBRYO: ErIcs, LAW AND PRACTICE IN HUMAN EMBRY-
OLOGY 283, 283 (Donald Evans ed., 1996). Therapeutic research is performed for the
benefit of the embryo. Id. Non-therapeutic research is performed for the benefit of
another, without regard for the interests of the embryo. See id. Non-therapeutic re-
search is "not designed to benefit [the] specific embryo" subjected to research. Id.
Some of the more well-known uses of non-therapeutic embryonic research occur
in cloning and embryonic stem-cell research. See Francis Fukuyama, The House Was
Right To Ban Cloning, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2001, at A14 (stating that therapeutic or
research cloning involves the creation of a human embryo for destruction); Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Science Academy Supports Cloning To Treat Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2002, at Al (quoting the National Academy of Sciences panel report that reproduc-
tive cloning is "'dangerous and likely to fail'"); see also Rick Weiss & Ceci Connolly,
Experts Urge Ban on Cloned Babies, WAsII. PosT, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al (noting that a legal
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a breeding ground for moral and political debate because the re-
search requires the destruction of human embryos. 4 Debates over the
federal funding of embryonic stem-cell research and the legality of
cloning have produced factions in political parties and interest groups
alike, creating dividing lines in unexpected places. 5 In November
2001, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a company specializing in
biotechnology, revealed that it had cloned a human embryo. 6 More
recently, on December 27, 2002, Clonaid, a corporation associated
with the Raelian religion, 7 claimed it had facilitated the birth of the
world's first human clone." Both announcements added fervor to the
cloning debate.
ban on reproductive cloning alone would create "a de facto federal insistence on
embryo destruction").
4 See Gatitam Naik, In 2 Separate Studies, Human Stem Cells Are Used To Generate
Brain Tissue in Mice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at B14.
5 See Antonio Regalado et. al., Stem-Cell Issue Entangles Science and Policy, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 10, 2001, at A10. The Regalado article notes that the debate about embryonic
stem-cell research does not divide along pro-life/pro-choice lines. Id. For example,
the article states that pro-life Senators Orrin Hatch and Bill Frist support such re-
search, while the pro-choice United Methodist Church opposes such research. Id.; see
also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some for Abortion Rights Lean Right in Cloning Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2002, at A25 (debunking the idea that the cloning debate is "a classic left-
right clash" and describing the formation of a liberal-conservative coalition to oppose
cloning); Rick Weiss, Bush Backs Broad Ban on Human Cloning, WASH. PoST, June 21,
2001, at Al. Noting pro-life Senator Orrin Hatch's support of non-therapeutic embry-
onic research, Weiss credits the debate on embryonic stem-cell research with "giv[ing]
rise to unusual political bedfellows." Id. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Weiss
describes reproductive rights advocates' support of a total ban on human cloning and
refers to the support as "an unusual political crossover." Id.
6 See Antonio Regalado et al., Stem-Cell Researchers Make Cloned Embryos of a Living
Human, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2001, at Al. Although ACT claimed to have been the
first to clone an embryo, others discredited the claim, saying that ACT had done
nothing new. See Paul Elias, Cloning Co. Faces Stiff Competition, AP ONUNE, Nov. 26,
2001, available at 2001 WL 30249068. Cythera, a competitor of ACT, responded to the
news by saying, "It's been known for quite some time that you could do this and get a
one or two cell division." Id. The New York Times reported, "[ACT] could not even
report that it had used ground breaking techniques, its methods had already been
used in animals." Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, A Breakthrough on Cloning? Perhaps,
or Perhaps Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al.
7 Manuel Roig-Franzia & Rick Weiss, Religious Sect Says It Cloned Human, WASH.
POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A3. The Raelian religion holds that all humans are clones of
aliens. Id.
8 Clonaid's claim that it has delivered the first human clone is unconfirmed. See
id. (noting that Clonaid offered no proof to support its claim); see also House Members
Again Seek To Ban Human Cloning, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at A5 (noting that
Clonaid's claim has not yet been confirmed). The scientific community, though skep-
tical of Clonaid's claim, has not dismissed this claim. See Roig-Franzia & Weiss, supra
136o [VOL. 78:4
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With increasing advancements in the field of embryonic research,
cloning is no longer a mere science-fiction idea. Cloning is a reality.9
Biotechnology companies continue to submit various patent applica-
tions for the process of human cloning and for the resulting human
clones."l Seeking to avoid the debate on patenting embryos, the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) will state only that it "does not is-
sue patents drawn to human beings"'" because the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits such patents. 12 Commentators believe, how-
ever, that it will not be long before the PTO does grant patents on
human embryos.1 3 Others believe that the PTO has already granted
such patents.
14
note 7 (quoting a cloning expert with ACT as saying that while highly questionable,
Clonaid's claim "'cannot be completely dismissed because it may be rather easier
than any of us thought to clone a human"').
9 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
10 See Amy Fagan, University's Cloning Patent Raises a "Mammal" Issue, WASH. TIMES,
May 21, 2002, at A12; USPTO Grants Patent Related to Human Reproductive Cloning, Bi-
OTECH PATENT NEWS, May 1, 2002, at 11 (detailing three such patents pending before
the PTO); see also Antonio Regalado, Kansas Senator Seeks To Block Patents on People,
WALL ST. J., May 17, 2002, at B7 (stating that the PTO "has issued several patents
covering methods of genetically engineering humans .... [which] appear to give
several U.S. universities rights to novel ways of creating human embryos in the labora-
tory, and in some cases bringing them to term").
11 Neil Munro, The Nero Patent Puzzle, 34 NAT'LJ. 577, 629 (2002) (quoting state-
ment by the chief spokesman for the PTO).
12 Aaron Zitner, Patently Provoking a Debate, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2002, at Al (not-
ing that "[s]ome patent experts doubt that this stance [reliance on the Thirteenth
Amendment].is legally sound"). The PTO also justifies its position through statutory
interpretation. Although Congress has never specifically addressed the subject, the
PTO interprets the patent laws to exclude humans. Id.
In a recent rejection notice of a patent, the PTO "appears to concede that it has
little or no legal authority" to prevent the patenting of human embryos. Aaron
Zitner, Of Mice and Men, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL,June 3, 2002, at IG; see also infra note
192.
13 See Dashka Slater, huMouse, 1 LEGAL AFT. 20, 23 (2002); see also Zitner, supra
note 12 (quoting a patent attorney as stating that there are compelling scientific rea-
sons for wanting a patent on a human embryo and noting that biotech companies will
likely pressure the PTO to grant patents on human embryos).
14 On April 3, 2001, the PTO issued patent No. 6,211,429 to the University of
Missouri at Columbia. Justin Gillis, A New Callfor Cloning Policy, WASH. POST, May 17,
2002, at A12. This utility patent covers not only a method for cloning mammals but
also "' the cloned products produced by these methods.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the
specific language of the patent). Although similar patents on cloning contain explicit
language excluding humans from the patent's coverage, the Missouri patent contains
no such language. Id. When asked about the Missouri patent, a PTO spokeswoman
refused to comment, stating only, "'Our policy has not changed.... We do not patent
claims drawn to humans."' Id.; see also William Kristol &Jeremy Rifkin, First Test of the
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This Note examines the claim that the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against slavery prohibits the patenting of human embryos.
Part I establishes the humanity of the human embryo. Part II dis-
cusses in general the regulations of patent law and the application of
those regulations to biotechnology. Part III considers the relevance of
abortion law to the patenting of human embryos. Part IV traces the
development of the Thirteenth Amendment and establishes its mean-
ing. Part V applies the Thirteenth Amendment to the patenting of
human embryos. This Note concludes that patenting a human em-
bryo violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
I. THE HUMANIY OF THE EMBRYO
Before considering the question of whether human embryos are
patentable, one must first determine the biological status of an em-
bryo. What is an embryo? The term "embryo" refers to "the. unborn
human from fertilization to 8-10 weeks gestation."15 Human develop-
ment begins with fertilization, the union of an egg and a sperm. 1
6
Fertilization creates an embryo' 7 possessing the forty-six chromo-
Biotech Age: Human Cloning, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at Bl1 (stating that "[l]ife sci-
ence companies already have patented ... human embryos"). Shortly thereafter, Sen.
Sam Brownback of Kansas offered legislation prohibiting patents on human embryos.
See Amy Fagan, Brownback Stays with Effort To Pass Human-Cloning Ban, WASH. TIMES,
June 15, 2002, at A5. That legislation was promptly defeated. See Amy Fagan, Cloning
Proposal Stripped from Bill, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A4.
15 Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469,
474 (1998). This Note does not distinguish between the so-called preembryo and the
embryo. The preembryo-embryo distinction did not exist until recently and has been
discredited by science. RONAN O'RAHILLY & FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY &
TERATOLOGY 88 (3d ed. 2001). The term "preembryo" was created in 1986 "largely for
public policy reasons." Id. The term has been rejected by human embryologists as
"ill-defined," "inaccurate," "unjustified," and "equivocal." Id.
Even now, in light of controversy over non-therapeutic embryonic research, pro-
ponents of the research have attempted to create new "scientific" terms to replace the
word "embryo." SeeJ. Bottum, While the Senate Sleeps, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 10, 2001,
at 9-10 (stating that "insistence from Michael West [president of ACT] and others
that their clones aren't really embryos but 'somatic cells' is falsified by their own Scien-
tific American article, which announces 'the first human embryos produced using the
technique of nuclear transplantation, otherwise known as cloning"'); Tim Graham,
Monstrous, Inc., WORLD, Dec. 8, 2001, at 22 (noting the attempts of ACT's lead advisor
to persuade reporters to refer to the company's human embryos as "activated eggs").
16 See BRUCE M. CARLSON, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 3
(1994); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORI-
ENTED EMBRYOLOGY 14 (5th ed. 1993).
17 See CARLSON, supra note 16, at 3.
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somes that "mark the human species." 18 Fertilization produces "an
individual member of the species homo sapiens sapiens-or [a] human
being."' 9 That human being is the embryo.
2 1
The embryo possesses the essential elements of humanity. From
the embryo come all cells in the human body. 21 The embryo begins as
a one-celled zygote and then divides into multiple totipotent 2 cells
called blastomeres.2 -3 Totipotent cells have "unlimited developmental
capacity,"24 or the ability to form any cell in the human body. Those
blastomeres differentiate into "structurally and functionally special-
ized" cells.2 5 The embryo's cells are "metabolizing (processing matter
and energy within the cells), reproducing, and growing."2 6 Just like a
newborn, a teenager, or an adult, the embryo is growing and
developing.
The embryo is a unique genetic individual. 27 Fertilization deter-
mines his sex and genetic identity.2 8 Because the embryo contains
"the entire genetic code of the individual," 29 he is a distinct human
being with a distinct identity. With predispositions to certain condi-
tions such as heart disease, 3°1 the embryo is "destined for a specific
18 Forsythe, supra note 15, at 475-76 (citing CARLSON, supra note 16, at 31).
19 Id. at 475; see also BRADLEY M. PA'rrEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 54 (2d ed. 1953)
(stating that fertilization "marks the initiation of the life of a new individual").
20 See, e.g., ERICH BLECHSCHMIDT, THE BEGINNINGS OF HUMAN LIFE 17 (1977) (stat-
ing that "the evidence no longer allows a discussion as to if and when and in what
month of ontogenesis a human being is formed. To be a human being is decided for
an organism at the moment of fertilization"); MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 16, at 1, 6
(stating that fertilization is "the beginning of a new human being"); O'RAHILLY &
MOLLER, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that an embryo is a "developing human being").
21 Forsythe, supra note 15, at 476.
22 CARLSON, supra note 16, at 60; see also O'RAHILLY & MOLLER, supra note 15, at
23 (stating that each blastomere is "capable, on isolation, of forming a complete
embryo").
23 CARLSON, supra note 16, at 31-33.
24 Id. at 137.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See O'RAHILLY & MtLLER, supra note 15, at 23; Forsythe, supra note 15, at 477.
28 See CARLSON, supra note 16, at 31; MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 16, at 32;
O'RAHILLY & MOYLLER, supra note 15, at 20.
29 Forsythe, supra note 15, at 477; see also O'RAHILLY & MOLLER, supra note 15, at
20.
30 See O'RAHILLY & MOLLER, supra note 15, at 71; see also CARLSON, supra note 16,
at 123-25 (noting that an embryo can have a predisposition to a shortened life-span
due to Down's syndrome); O'RAHILLY & MOLLER, supra note 15, at 71 (noting that an
embryo can be predisposed to develop diabetes).
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life."3' Fertilization sets the embryo "on a predetermined pathway of
life."3 2
From fertilization, the human embryo is a genetically distinct
human being. The embryo is not mere human material or potential
human life. An embryo is a human being:33
[T]he embryo from the earliest moment has the active capacity to
articulate itself into what everyone acknowledges is a human being.
The embryo is a being; that is to say, it is an integral whole with
actual existence. The being is human; it will not articulate itself
into some other kind of animal. Any being that is human is a human
being. If it is objected that, at five days or fifteen days, the embryo
does not look like a human being, it must be pointed out that this is
precisely what a human being looks like-and what each of us
looked like-at five or fifteen days of development.3 4
Biology confirms that the embryo is a human being.3 5 Nonethe-
less, some may argue that abortion jurisprudence suggests otherwise.
Part III will examine that argument.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PATENT LAW
After determining the status of the human embryo, one can then
consider the applicability of relevant law to the patenting of human
embryos. As noted in the Introduction, the relevant law is primarily
constitutional. Relevant to the question of whether human embryos
can be patented are patent law, abortion law, and Thirteenth Amend-
ment law. Though the three areas of law begin with the Constitution,
patent law devolves into statutory law. For that reason, this Note will
discuss the application of both constitutional and statutory law to the
patenting of human embryos.
The first relevant area of law is patent law. To promote scientific
advancement, the Framers drafted the Patent Clause as a means of
rewarding the labor of inventors. The Patent Clause grants Congress
the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
31 Kelly Hollowell, Essay, Cloning: Exposing Flaws in the Preembryo-Embiyo Distinction
and Redefining When Life Begins, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 337 (1999).
32 Id. at 338.
33 See, e.g., BLECHSCHMIDT, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that the human embryo
develops into a man rather than a chicken because a human embryo is a human
being, not a chicken egg); MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 16, at 1, 6 (stating that
fertilization is "the beginning of a new human being"); O'RAHILLY & MOLLER, supra
note 15, at 5 (noting that an embryo is a "developing human being").
34 The Inhuman Use of Human Beings: A Statement on Embryo Research, FIRsT THINGS,
Jan. 1995, at 17, 17-18 (emphasis added).
35 See supra note 33.
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securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to
their... Discoveries."36 Congress exercises this power through a pat-
ent system overseen by the PTO.3 7 In exchange for disclosure of the
details of an invention, an inventor receives a patent from the govern-
ment.38 Depending on the patent, a patent grants its holder a four-
teen-39 or twenty-year 4°' right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented invention.4 1 If the invention is a process, the pat-
ent also grants its holder the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the products of the patented invention.42
To receive a patent, an invention must satisfy the statutory condi-
tions for patentability. First, the inventions must be useful,
43 novel,'4 4
and nonobvious. 45 Second, the invention must fall within a category
of patentable subject matter. In delineating patentable subject mat-
ter, Congress has created several categories of patents. The category
most relevant to our discussion is the utility patent.46 Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, utility patents are granted to "a process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof."47 Of the different patents, the utility patent covers the
broadest subject matter because the words "machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter" have "a meaning as broad as the human
mind can range. '4
8
The statutory language of the utility patent was not always inter-
preted so broadly, however. Until recently, living organisms were not
considered patentable. In 1974, the PTO rejected patent applications
for microorganisms 49 and multicellular organisms. 51 Stating that "35
U.S.C. 101 must be strictly construed," the PTO Board of Appeals held
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
38 See id. § 112.
39 A design patent grants its holder a fourteen-year right. See id. § 173.
40 A plant or utility patent grants its holder a twenty-year right. See id. § 154.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. § 101.
44 See id. § 102.
45 See id. § 103.
46 See id. § 101.
47 Id.
48 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 41 (4th ed. 1998).
49 See 1 IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TrFI LAW § 2:3 (2002).
50 Id. § 2:4.
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that strict construction "precludes the patenting of a living
organism."'
In 1980, the Supreme Court reviewed the PTO's interpretation of
35 U.S.C. § 101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.52 A five-to-four decision
held that an organism could be a "manufacture" or "composition of
matter" within the meaning of § 101. -3 The Court reasoned that "the
relevant distinction [is] not between living and inanimate things, but
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions."54 Noting that Congress drafted the section in "expansive
terms," the Court stated that the statutory subject matter "include [s]
anything under the sun that is made by man.
'5 5
Thereafter, relying on its interpretation of the Chakrabarty deci-
sion, the PTO announced that it would consider "nonnaturally occur-
ring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals, to
be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101. ' '5 6
The PTO regulations state that under Chakrabarty "the question of
whether or not an invention embraces living matter is irrelevant to the
issue of patentability." 57 However, according to PTO regulations, "[i]f
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a
whole encompasses a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C.
101 must be made.
'58
Because of the broad language used in § 101, a patent applica-
tion for a human embryo would likely fall in the utility category. 59
Analysis of whether a human embryo would satisfy the remaining stat-
utory requirements of patent law is beyond the scope of this Note.
This Note assumes, therefore, that a human embryo would satisfy the
requirements of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF ABORTION LAw
Abortion law is the second area of law relevant to the question of
patenting human embryos. Although some may argue that abortion
51 Ex pane Bergy, Coats, and Malik, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 79 (Pat. & Trademark Off.
Bd. App. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
52 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
53 Id. at 308.
54 Id. at 312-13.
55 Id. at 308-09.
56 U.S. PATENT OFFICE, DEPI. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PRO-
CEDURE § 2105 (8th ed. 2001).
57 Id.
58 Id.




law bears on the question, 60 those who make such an argument often
confuse a legal question with a biological question. They confuse the
terms "person" and "human being."6 1 Before examining the rele-
vance of abortion law, one must define those terms. "Person" is a le-
gal term; "human being," a biological term. "Person" is defined by
law; "human being," by science. "Person" has a meaning that changes
through time; "human being," a meaning that remains constant
through time.
"Person" is a legal term defined subjectively by law. Under the
law, a human being may not be a "person" but a non-human being may
be a "person." Whether someone or something is a person depends
upon the context of the question. For example, in the United States,
the law makes Jane Doe, a non-resident alien not present in the
United States, a non-person for purposes of Fifth Amendment law 62
but makes corporation ABC, Inc. of Delaware a person for purposes of
federal statutory law.63
In contrast with "person," "human being" is a biological term de-
fined objectively by science. A human being is "a member of the spe-
cies homo sapiens." 64 Therefore, non-citizens are human beings, and
corporations are not. Although non-residents can sometimes be non-
persons, non-residents can never be non-humans, and though corpo-
rations can sometimes be persons, corporations can never be humans.
Non-citizen Jane Doe became a human being at fertilization. Hence,
even as an unknown embryo, Jane Doe was a human being. The law
cannot change the scientific fact that an embryo is a human being.65
60 See Dan Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1597, 1656 (1993) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment does not
apply to human embryos because they are not "persons"). Although Burk does state
that "the discussion of the embryo's status must necessarily stand on a different legal
footing than that of the discussion of fetal abortion," he defines the limits of the
Thirteenth Amendment with Roe v. Wade's concept of personhood. Id. at 1652-56
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)).
61 See id. at 1656 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to
human embryos because they are not "persons"); Stevan M. Pepa, Note, International
Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415, 447
n.116 (1998) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, for the proposition that the Constitution
provides no protection to human embryos because they are not "persons").
62 SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783-85 (1950) (holding that the word
"person" in the Fifth Amendment does not include non-resident, extraterritorial
aliens).
63 See The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Dictionary Act defines "per-
son" as including "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, socie-
ties, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." Id.
64 Forsythe, supra note 15, at 478.
65 See supra Part I.
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Abortion law deals not with the humanity of the embryo but
rather with the "personhood" of the embryo. In Roe v. Wade,66 the
Court held that fetuses were not "persons" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 However, because the term "person" is a
legal term, the meaning of "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment
could change at any time. The Constitution could be amended to
read as follows: "The word 'person' as used within the Constitution
shall henceforth be defined as blue-eyed, blond-haired female citizens
having reached 21 years of age." Were that amendment passed,
aliens, males, children, brunettes, and many other individuals would
no longer be "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, those "non-persons" would still be human beings.
Similarly, although the law often considered African-American
slaves "non-persons,""6 the slaves were undoubtedly human beings. By
the same logic, although the law may consider embryos to be "non-
persons," embryos are still human beings because of their member-
ship in the species homo sapiens. A lack of personhood under the law
does not equal a lack of humanity.
Although Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey"'" addressed
the legal status of embryos, neither case bears on the question of
human embryo patentability. The cases are inapplicable to the issue
because neither case addressed the ownership of human beings. Roe
v. Wade answered the following questions: (1) does a woman have a
constitutional right to an abortion?7" and (2) if a woman has a right to
an abortion, when can the state limit that right?7 I The Court held
that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion 72 that can be
66 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67 Id. at 158.
68 See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding
that blacks were not entitled to constitutional protections). In his decision, Chief
Justice Taney stated that blacks were "beings of an inferior order" and "so far inferior
[to whites], that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Id. at
407. Although the Dred Scott Court defined the constitutional meaning of "citizen"
rather than "person," commentators agree that the decision stands as a denial of the
legal personhood of slaves. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in
Constitutional Law, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (2001) (stating that Dred Scott held that
"slaves are property, and not persons"); Cass Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes
on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1361 & n.154 (2000) (citing Dred Scott for
the proposition that the law did not consider slaves to be persons).
69 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
70 Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 153.
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limited only to protect a viable fetus 73 if the limitation does not en-
danger the mother's health.74 While the Court recognized the state
interest in protecting the fetus, the Court also noted the "[s]pecific
and direct harm" that pregnancy may impose upon a woman.75
The Court rejected the argument that a fetus had a fundamental
right to life under the Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees rights only to a "per-
son."77 The Court further held that a fetus is not a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Amendment's
use of the word "person" has no "possible pre-natal application." 78
The Court expressly declined to reach the question of whether un-
born children are human beings.79 According to the Court, the hu-
manity of the embryo had no relevance to the conclusion that
Fourteenth Amendment rights do not extend to fetusesH° Whether a
fetus is human or not, he has no rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8' As the Court stated, even if the fetus is a human being, he is
not a human being "entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection."82
In Casey, the Court affirmed the central holding of Roe but modi-
fied Roe's trimester framework because "it misconceive [d] the nature
of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalue[d]
the State's interest in potential life." ' In upholding the fundamental
right to abortion, the Court noted that pregnancy makes the woman
"unique to the human condition and so unique to the law."8' 4 How-
ever, the Court buttressed the state's interest in protecting the life of
the fetus "from the outset of the pregnancy"8 5 by expanding the re-
strictions that a state may place on the right to an abortion.86
73 Id. at 164-65.
74 Id. at 165. A state cannot prevent a woman from having an abortion "where it
is necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id.
75 Id. at 153.
76 Id. at 156-57.
77 See id.
78 Id. at 157.




83 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
84 Id. at 852. This reasoning and similar reasoning within Casey suggest that the
right to an abortion arises not from a right of privacy but rather from a right of bodily
autonomy. Id.
85 Id. at 846.
86 See id. at 878.
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Together Roe and Casey reflect a balancing of (1) the woman's
interest in her "bodily integrity"8 7 and (2) a state's substantial interest
in protecting unborn life from the moment of conception. 8 Because
they exist outside of her body, extracorporeal embryos do not impli-
cate a woman's interest in her "bodily integrity."819 Courts considering
the ownership of embryos have agreed that Roe and Casey do not con-
trol the decision. In Davis v. Davis,9°1 the Tennessee Supreme Court,
in determining ownership of a divorced couple's embryos, stated that
"[n] one of the concerns about a woman's bodily integrity... is appli-
cable here.' 11 Similarly, in Kass v. Kass,92 the Court of Appeals of New
York held that disposition of embryos "does not implicate a woman's
right of privacy or bodily integrity."93 Because abortion law has no
relevance outside of the context of a pregnancy, Roe and Casey's hold-
ings are irrelevant to the question of patenting human embryos.
Furthermore, Roe and Casey are inapplicable because neither case
decided the humanity of the fetus. The cases dealt only with the legal
personhood of the fetus. 94 Because extracorporeal embryos do not
implicate a woman's bodily integrity and because neither Roe nor
Casey dealt with the humanity of the fetus, abortion law bears no rela-
tion to question of patenting human embryos. 95 As law professor Dan
Burk noted, "the discussion of the embryo's status must necessarily
stand on a different legal footing than that of the discussion of fetal
abortion.'96
87 i. at 857.
88 See Jill Madden Melchoir, Comment, Cryogenically Preserved Embryos in Disposi-
tional Disputes and the Supreme Court: Breaking Impossible Ties, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 921,
941-42 (2000).
89 See Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection
of "Potential Life"?, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1011, 1038 (1995) (arguing that a woman's
right to "bodily autonomy" is invoked by the "intra-body nature of a pregnancy").
90 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
91 Id. at 601.
92 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998).
93 Id. at 564.
94 The legal personhood of the embryo is irrelevant because the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits the enslavement of human beings. See infra Part IV. The scope
of the Amendment is not limited to legal persons. See infra Part IV.
95 Abortion law's recognition of the state's interest in protecting potential human
life would bear some relation to the question. Because extracorporeal embryos do
not implicate a woman's bodily integrity, the state's interest in protecting the embryos
would be greater.
96 Burk, supra note 60, at 1652; see also George J. Annas et al., The Politics of
Human-Embryo Research-Avoiding Ethical Gridlock, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1329 (1996)




IV. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The last area of law relevant to the question of patenting human
embryos is the Thirteenth Amendment. A relatively short amend-
ment, the full text of the Thirteenth Amendment reads,
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation .97
Though brief in text, the Amendment speaks volumes in history.
The principle of the Thirteenth Amendment incited the bloodiest war
ever fought by Americans. s By the time of the Amendment's propo-
sal, the debate of its merit had already been fleshed out in the public
square:99 "By the mid-eighteen hundreds, the abolitionist movement
and the question of whether slavery should be abolished pervaded the
American consciousness." 100 For this reason, the members of Con-
gress "did not need to recite the particulars of the evils of slavery to
justify the Amendment."101 To understand wholly the Amendment,
therefore, one must consider it within its full historical context. 10
2
Public debates, congressional debates, and judicial interpretation es-
tablish that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished human slavery.
Public debate over slavery had existed since the country's found-
ing. 103 By 1865, "virtually everyone ... understood slavery as chattel-
97 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
98 GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE EMBODIMENT OF FREE-
DOM IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 123 (1987) (defining slavery as the "root prob-
lem" of the war); id. at 83 (citing President Lincoln's assertion that without slavery the
Civil War would not have occurred). But see id. at 68-69 (stating that conservatives, or
Unionists, believed that the war was not about slavery but rather about the preserva-
tion of the Union).
99 SeeJoyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 218 (1992).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 218-19 (arguing that the debates do not offer the insight into the under-
standing of the framers that the materials preserving the public debates over the
Amendment do).
103 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAw, & POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9-15 (1981) (discussing the "obstacle to American union"
that slavery had caused "since the beginning of independence" and describing efforts
to abolish slavery).
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ism,'"' 4 the idea that human beings can be property. 115  The
abhorrence of that idea fueled the abolitionist movement.1 06 The rec-




chattelism'0 8 underscored the movement to abolish slavery.
Chattelism, according to abolitionists, is inhumane because it de-
nies basic human rights 119 inalienable to all humans. 110 The political
philosophy that led to the founding of the United States had
grounded itself on the existence of inalienable human rights. The
founding documents reflect that fact: the Declaration of Indepen-
dence affirms the inalienability of human rights, and the Constitution
rests upon a respect for human rights.I 1I By denying the inalienability
of those rights, slavery evidenced a nation "decadently unmoored
from its basis in the political theory of human rights."' 
12
Because human slavery conflicted with the "rights-based theory of
the Constitution [that] condemned slavery as a violation of inaliena-
ble human rights,"" I3I only an unambiguous abolition of human slav-
ery could protect human rights.' 14 Abolitionists believed that only "a
conception of national institutions with adequate competence and
104 HERMAN BELz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREED-
MEN'S RIGHTs 1861 TO 1866, at 121 (2000).
105 See, e.g., id. at 116 (stating that Republicans [the majority party at the time of
the Amendment's passage] defined chattelism as "the holding of property in man").
106 HOEMANN, supra note 98, at 39.
107 ld. (emphasis added).
108 See, e.g., BELZ, supra note 104, at 121 (stating that "virtually everyone in 1865
understood slavery as chattelism").
109 See HOEMANN, supra note 98, at 39.
110 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403,
405 (1993) (arguing that slavery treats "human beings with God-given rights" as prop-
erty); David A.J. Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Recon-
struction Amendments, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (recognizing that "the rights-
based theory of the Constitution condemned slavery as a violation of inalienable
human rights").
111 Richards, supra note 110, at 1194 (citing James Madison for the proposition
that republican constitutionalism rests upon a respect for human rights); see also
FEIIRENBACHER, supra note 103, at 8 (noting that "[i]f words [of the Declaration of
Independence] were read for their plainest meaning, slavery was incompatible with
the fundamental assumption of the Declaration of Independence-that all men are
created equal and endowed by their creator with the inalienable rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness").
112 Richards, supro note 110, at 1193.
113 Id. at 1192.
114 See HOEMANN, supra note 98, at 45-47 (noting that the destruction of slavery
automatically revived inalienable human rights).
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power to ensure that the states, like the national government, respect
the human rights of all Americans"' 1' could properly abolish slavery.
Public commentary after the passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment confirmed that the abolitionists had succeeded in securing
human rights throughout the country. William Lloyd Garrison, a cen-
tral leader of the abolitionist movement, declared that the Amend-
ment had "constitutionalized the Declaration of Independence."
'" 16
The New York Times wrote that the "republic would now be 'thor-
oughly democratic-resting on human rights as its basis."' 17 Echoing
Garrison and the New York Times, the Black New Orleans Tribune stated
that the Amendment abolished all "classes or castes" among
humans." 8 These statements confirm that the Amendment abolished
human slavery.
Congressional debate also shows that the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery. Congress had discussed the evils of slavery long
before the proposal of the Amendment. 19 By the time of the Amend-
ment's proposal, Congress had generally accepted the humanity of
slaves.' 20 Thus, when considering the Amendment, members of Con-
gress did not debate the humanity of the slaves because the members
believed the slaves were human beings.' 2 ' Rather, the members de-
bated when, if ever, it was "legitimate" to own humans.
At a minimum, the Amendment abolished chattelism, or prop-
erty interest in a human being. 122 Describing the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Rep. Green Clay Smith announced: "We intend to establish the
great truth that man cannot hold property in man."' 23 Congress con-
cluded that chattelism could never be legitimate. Accordingly, the
115 Richards, supra note 110, at 1198.
116 BELZ, supra note 104, at 116.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 During a debate over discrimination on railroads, Charles Sumner, a promi-
nent abolitionist and Massachusetts senator, declared, "[W] henever slavery is in ques-
tion, human rights are constantly disregarded .... " HOEMANN, supra note 98, at 106.
In another context, Rep. Theodore Weld argued that Congress had the power to
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia because the "[p]rotection [of human
rights] is the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of every human being under the exclusive
legislation of Congress .... " Richards, supra note 110, at 1195 (emphasis omitted).
120 See generally CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), repinted in THE RECON-
STRUCcFrION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DE-
BATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, l41ii, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 65-69, 75-77, 81-86
(Alfred Avins ed., 1967) (showing that although some congressmen denied the equal-
ity of the slaves, no congressman denied the humanity of the slaves).
121 Id.
122 BELZ, supra note 104, at 116.
123 Id. at 117.
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Thirteenth Amendment prohibited all human slavery. 124 Congress did
not limit the scope of the Amendment to black slavery.'
25
The debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment further establish that the Thirteenth Amendment
banned chattelism.126  Believing that the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished chattelism and guaranteed basic human rights, several con-
gressmen moved to pass civil rights legislation under the authority of
the Thirteenth Amendment. 2 7 Other congressmen disagreed with
that expansive interpretation, 128 believing that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment secured only "the right not to be held in bondage."'129 These
congressmen argued that "slavery was defined as chattelism rather
than as a denial of all political and civil rights. ' 3 1 To protect civil
rights, claimed these congressmen, the country would have to pass a
second amendment, the Fourteenth.' 3 ' Therefore, even congressmen
restricting the Thirteenth Amendment to its narrowist interpretation
agreed that the Amendment prohibited property ownership of
humans. ,3 2 The Thirteenth Amendment established that no human
being can be enslaved.
Jurisprudence confirms the abolition of chattelism by the Thir-
teenth Amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases,'13 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Amendment abolished human slavery.'3 4 The
Court described the Amendment as the "grand yet simple declaration
124 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).
125 See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
126 See BELZ, supra note 104, at 124.
127 See id. at 116-20.
128 See RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURT]EENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
20-21 (1989).
129 BELZ, supra note 104, at 124.
130 Id.
131 See BERGER, supra note 128, at 20; see aLso Richard M. Lebovitz, The Accordion of
the Thirteenth Amendment: Quasi-Persons and the Right of Self-Interest, 14 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 561, 564-65 (2002) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment protects some-
thing less than full personhood because African Americans "were made full persons
by separate legislation-the Fourteenth, not Thirteenth Amendment").
132 See BELZ, supra note 104, at 166.
133 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
134 Id. at 69. The Court further strengthened the fact that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment applied to human beings rather than only "citizens" or "persons" in its discus-
sion of the meaning of "involuntary servitude." The Court held that the word
"involuntary" "can only apply to human beings." Id. It would almost defy common
sense to argue that Congress intended the abolition of a lesser evil, involuntary servi-
tude, to apply to all human beings but intended the abolition of the greater evil,
slavery, to apply only to select human beings.
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of the personal freedom of all the human race."'13 5 Similarly, in the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court referred to the Amendment as "an abso-
lute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in
any part of the United States. ' 136 Regarding the claim that the
Amendment abolished African-American slavery, the Court stated that
the Amendment "forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereaf-
ter." 1 37 Public commentary, congressional debate, and Supreme
Court jurisprudence confirm that the Thirteenth Amendment abol-
ishes slavery of all human beings.
13 8
Some may argue that the framers of the Amendment intended
the term "human being" to be defined by law rather than by science.
In other words, a "human being" would refer to a select class of
human beings rather than to all human beings.' 39 Those accepting
this idea would argue that the framers intended the term "human be-
ing" to include only post-natal human beings. For example, they
might propose that the framers defined "human being" as "a post-
natal member of the species homo sapiens." According to that defini-
tion, the Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit ownership of post-
natal human beings but would allow ownership of pre-natal human
beings. Thus, ownership of human embryos would not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment.
135 Id.
136 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
137 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
138 That the framers understood the Amendment to abolish human slavery is
widely, if not universally, accepted. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 110, at 405-06 (assum-
ing without discussion that the Thirteenth Amendment freed human beings from
slavery); McConnell, supra note 99, at 211-12 (accepting without debate the proposi-
tion that the framers intended the Thirteenth Amendment to "abolish ... legal own-
ership of any human being"); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 22 (2002) (accepting without debate that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment prohibits one from possessing "any property in a human being" (quoting Win-
ter S. Martin, A Memorandum on the Substitute Bill S. 2497, Injunctions in Labor
Disputes, S. Doc. No. 71-327, at 2, 13 (1931))); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at
69 (describing the Thirteenth Amendment as the "grand yet simple declaration of the
personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government").
But see Burk, supra note 60, at 1656 (stating that because the Thirteenth Amendment
protects "persons," human embryos may be excluded from the Amendment's
protection).
139 Proponents of this idea would argue that just as law could expand the defini-
tion of person to include corporations, the law could limit the definition of "human
being" to post-natal human beings.
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Such an argument is insupportable for two reasons. First, history
provides no support for the argument that the framers intended to
define "human being" as post-natal human beings. No relevant
sources-neither public commentary, congressional debates, nor fed-
eral jurisprudence-suggest that the framers determined to alter the
definition of human being from its scientific meaning. Even those
claiming that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to human
embryos do not argue that it is inapplicable because embryos are not
human beings. 1411 Rather, those commentators contend that the Thir-
teenth Amendment applies not to human beings but to persons. 14 1
Second, historical sources show that the framers understood
"human being" to include pre-natal human beings. The 1800s intro-
duced a period of increased awareness about the physiological
processes of the female body, particularly the reproductive process.
142
The literature of the day reveals that the medical community and the
general public believed the unborn child to be a human being. That
belief arose from "a new understanding of fetal development as con-
tinuous from the moment of conception."14 Both reproductive liter-
140 See generally Lebovitz, supra note 131; Matthew R. Pahl, Note, It Takes Two, Baby:
Fathers, the Tort of Conversion, and Its Application to the Abortion of Pre-Viability Fetuses, 24
WIIrI'IER L. REV. 221, 231 (2002). But see Rachel E. Fishman, Note, Patenting Human
Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection ?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461,
474-75 (1989) (conceding that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to human beings
but arguing that the meaning of "human being " is no longer clear).
141 See Burk, supra note 60, at 1656 (stating that "[e]mbryos may very well not fit
the Thirteenth ... Amendment concept of 'persons"'); Nicolas P. Terry, "Alas! Poor
Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and
Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 465-66 (1986) (arguing
that the Thirteenth Amendment serves to protect legal personhood); Pahl, supra note
140, at 231-32 (considering the personhood of the embryo to determine whether the
Thirteenth Amendment protects embryos); Russell H. Walker, Note, Patent Law-
Should Genetically Engineered Human Beings Be Patentable?, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 101,
103 n.14 (stating that a human being may be patentable under the Thirteenth
Amendment because "it is less than clear that a human being [is a person]"); see also
George J. Annas, Of Monkeys, Man, and Oysters, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Aug. 1987, at
20, 22 (asking, "Since cloned human embryos are not persons protected by the Con-
stitution .... could a particularly 'novel' and 'useful' human embryo be patented,
cloned, and sold?"); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense
of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480, 515-18 (1990) (arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment does not apply to fetuses because they cannot be proven to be persons).
142 See generally JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINE-
TEENTII CENTURY AMERIC:A (1994) (detailing the history of reproductive enlighten-
ment that occurred during the nineteenth century).
143 See Mary Krane Derr, Introduction to "MAN'S INHUMANITY TO WOMAPI, MAKES




ature and abortion commentary describe the unborn child as a
human being.
In 1853 Dr. Stephen Tracy wrote in his book The Mother and Her
Offspring, that a human being's life "commenced at the time of the
formation of the embryonic cell-at the moment of conception."'
144
Two years later, in 1855, Dr. David Humphreys Storer instructed
Harvard's Medical College on the humanity of the embryo, describing
the embryo as "a human being" from "[t]he moment an embryo en-
ters the uterus a microscopic speck."' 45 In 1859, Dr. Horatio R.
Storer, a professor at Berkshire Medical College, wrote that the em-
bryo is "from the very outset, a human being alive, however early its
stage of development, and existing independently of its mother."
146
Because the embryo is a human being, Storer continued, the embryo
has "however undeveloped . . . an intellectual, moral, and spiritual
nature, the inalienable attribute of humanity."'147 The medical profes-
sion agreed that human life begins at conception.
The medical profession not only agreed on the humanity of the
embryo but also communicated that belief to the general public. As
noted above, the nineteenth century welcomed a period of reproduc-
tive enlightenment, particularly among women. Female gynecology
once considered taboo became the topic of public lectures and lay-
men's texts. 148 By the mid-nineteenth century, works on the female
reproductive system were "widely available" from "the local newsstand,
bookstore, stationers, or from peddlers and agents, or by mail
order." 149
Perhaps the nineteenth century's most renowned lecturer on the
female reproductive system,'15 Dr. Frederick Hollick, in his book Ma-
tron's Manual of Midwifery, referred to the unborn child as a human
being and stated that the child's life begins at conception. 15 1 In her
144 STEPHEN TRACY, THE MOTHER AND HER OFFSPRING 109 (1853).
145 David Humphreys Storer, An Introductory Lecture Before the Medical Class of
1855-56 of Harvard University (Nov. 7, 1855), reprinted in part in D. Humphreys
Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, 6J. GYNECOLOGICAL Soc'Y OF BOSTON 194,
199 (1872).
146 Horatio R. Storer, Criminal Abortion, 3 N.-AM. MEDICO-CHIRURGICAL REV. 64, 69
(1859).
147 Id. at 72.
148 See generally BRODIE, supra note 142, at 87-135 (describing how the topic of
sexual reproduction changed from a private to a public subject).
149 Id. at 180.
150 SeeBRODIE, supra note 142, at 112-13.
151 FREDERICK HOLLICK, THE MATRON'S MANUAL OF MIDWIFERY AND THE DISEASES OF
WOMEN DURING PREGNANCY AND IN CHILD BED 55-57, 61 (1848), reprinted in "MAN'S
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book on reproductive physiology, Dr. Alice Bunker Stockham wrote
that conception created a new human being:
When the female germ and male sperm unite, then is the inception
of a new life; all that goes to make up a human being-body, mind
and spirit, must be contained in embryo within this minute organ-
ism. Life must be present from the very moment of conception. If there was
not life there could not be conception. At what other period of a
human being's existence, either pre-natal or post-natal, could the
union of soul and body take place? 152
The commentary on abortion also demonstrates a belief in the
humanity of the unborn child. In 1839, Hugh Lenox Lodge, the chair
of obstetrics at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, con-
demned abortion because he believed embryos possessed the charac-
teristics of human beings. 53 In 1855, David Humphreys Storer, the
first professor of obstetrics at Harvard Medical School, called abortion
the destruction of a life, stating that a woman's abortion "destroy[s]
the life within her."'154 From the leadership of these two men grew a
movement by the American Medical Association (AMA) to criminalize
abortion, 5 5  or, as the physicians described it, "antenatal
infanticide." 156
In 1859, the AMA issued a Report on Criminal Abortion157 to ad-
dress "the slaughter of countless children" perpetrated by widespread
abortion in the U.S. 158 According to the AMA, because the embryo is
a human life "at every period of gestation," physicians could not con-
done abortion without violating their calling to save human lives. -15 9
The AMA stated, "[W]e hold it to be 'a thing deserving all hate and
detestation, that a man in his very originall, whiles he is framed, whiles
he is enlived, should be put to death under the very hands, and in the
INHUMANITY TO WOMAN, MAKES COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE": THE EARLY FEMINIST CASE
AGAINST ABORTION 6-8 (Mary Krane Derr ed., 1991).
152 ALICE BUNKER STOCKHAM, TOKOLOGY: A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 246 (rev. ed.
1887).
153 BRODIE, supra note 142, at 266.
154 Id. at 266-67.
155 See id. at 267.
156 Id. at 270.
157 In 1857, at its meeting in Nashville, the AMA appointed a committee to draft a
report on abortion. Horatio R. Storer, Criminal Abortion, 3 N. Am. MEDICO-CHIRURGI-
CAL REV. 1033, 1045 (1859). In 1859, the committee's findings and conclusions were
read at the AMA's convention in Louisville and were later published in the Transac-
tions of the American Medical Association.
158 Am. MED. ASS'N, REPORT ON CRIMINAL ABORTION 4 (1859).
159 Id. at 5.
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shop of, Nature."""" Recognizing the embryo's humanity, the AMA
called for a legislative end to abortion, the "wanton and murderous
destruction of [a] child."'16 1 With that call, "[f]or the rest of the cen-
tury, under the aegis of the AMA, physicians became the most single
visible single group seeking to tighten the laws against abortion."'
'" 2
In pursuit of such legislation, the AMA sent a Memorial to each
state's governor and legislature, stating that abortion was "the inten-
tional destruction of a child within its parent; and physicians are now
agreed, from actual and various proof, that the child is alive from the
moment of conception."'163 The Memorial then noted the "duty of the
American Medical Association .... publicly to enter an earnest and
solemn protest against such unwarrantable destruction of human life"
and called upon the state governor and legislators to criminalize abor-
tion. 164 With each Memorial, the AMA included a series of articles on
criminalizing abortion. The articles were written by Dr. Horatio R.
Storer and published in the in the North-American Medico-Chirurgical
Review. 165 The AMA sent similar materials to state medical socie-
ties. 166 Thereafter, nearly every state and territory enacted legislation
protecting the embryo from the moment of conception.
6 7
With those enactments, the medical profession, in its own words,
had successfully persevered in "the grand and noble calling we pro-
fess,-the saving of human life."168 More explicitly, Dr. Storer wrote
that by encouraging the protection of unborn human beings, the
medical profession had remained true to "'its mighty and responsible
office of shutting the great gates of human death."1 69 The actions
and publications of the AMA show that the profession's opposition to
abortion arose primarily from "a concern for the unborn child and
160 Id.
161 Id.; see also Bibliographical Notices: Professor Storer's Introductory, 53 BOSTON MED. &
SURG.J. 409, 410 (1856) (calling abortion a "horrible intra-uterine murder") (discussing
D. Humphreys Storer, An Introductory Lecture Before the Medical Class of 1855-56
of Harvard University (Nov. 7, 1855)).
162 BRODIE, supra note 142, at 267.
163 FREDERICK N. DYER, CHAMPION OF WOMEN AND THE UNBORN: HORATIO ROBIN-




167 Frederick N. Dyer, The Lecture That Started the Successjid "Physicians" Crusade
Against Abortion, at http://www.abortionessay.com/files/humphreys.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2003).
168 Storer, supra note 157, at 1045 & n.t (reprinting the resolutions adopted by
the AMA as appendices to the committee's report).
169 Id. at 1046.
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not... primarily a concern for the dangers to the woman of abortion,
elimination of irregular practitioners, enforcing gender rules, and/or
preventing an increase in the proportion of Catholic immigrants in
the population." 171
Not only the ARA but also many other individuals and organiza-
tions advocated for the criminalization of abortion to protect unborn
children.171 As Janet Farrell Brodie noted in her book Contraception
and Abortion in Nineteenth-Century America: "No campaign that succeeds
in changing the laws of almost every state in the union can be attrib-
uted solely to one individual.... Physicians and social purity reform-
ers won support from legislators, judges, government officials,
academics, and the public. '172 The passage of legislation criminaliz-
ing abortion, particularly in response to the AMA's campaign, demon-
strates that in the 1800s the national public regarded the embryo as a
human being.
The nineteenth-century feminist movement also strongly op-
posed abortion. 7-3 Feminist opposition to abortion rooted itself in
the new understanding of human life as existing from the moment of
conception. Feminists opposed abortion because it ended a human
being's life, but they favored contraception because it merely pre-
vented the creation of a human being. Dr. Stockham wrote, "There
may be no harm in preventing the conception of a life, but once con-
ceived it should not be deprived of its existence." 174 She wrote that
because abortion deprived a human being of its life, 175 the remedy for
unwanted pregnancies was "in the prevention of pregnancy, not in
producing abortion." 
76
Nineteenth-century feminist terminology for abortion reveals a
belief in the humanity of the unborn child. Feminists commonly re-
ferred to abortion as "child murder," "infanticide," and "ante-natal
murder.1 77 Susan B. Anthony, the woman likely most identified with
the feminist movement, 7 8 called abortion "child-murder.",'7 Sisters
Victoria Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin, two of the most outspoken
170 DYER, supra note 163, at 113.
171 See BRODIE, supra note 142, at 274.
172 Id.
173 Derr, supra note 143, at i.
174 STOCKHAM, supra note 152, at 247.
175 Id. at 246.
176 Id. at 250 (emphasis omitted).
177 Derr, supra note 143, at ii.
178 Mary Krane Derr, Susan B. Anthony, in "MAN'S INIUMANITY TO WOMAN, MAKES
COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE": THE EARLY FEMINIST CASE AGAINST ABORTION 23, 23 (Mary
Krane Derr ed., 1991).
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feminists of the day,'80 believed that a human's life begins at concep-
tion."" They described abortion as "the slaughter of the innocents"
and a murder "more revolting" than infanticide. 8 2
Both medical literature and abortion commentary reveal that in
1865 the public believed the human embryo to be a human being. No
historical literature shows the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment
intended to limit the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment to
postnatal human beings. Rather, public commentary, congressional
debate, and federal jurisprudence demonstrate that the framers in-
tended the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish castes among human
beings. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits property ownership in
human beings. Therefore, because the human embryo is a human
being, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the ownership of human
embryos.
V. THE PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN EMBRYOS
After determining the status of the human embryo and consider-
ing the relevant areas of law, one must then apply that law to deter-
mine whether the PTO can constitutionally grant patents on human
embryos. As noted earlier, in the landmark decision of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Court held that genetically-altered, multicellular orga-
nisms could be patented.' Until Chakrabarty, living organisms were
not considered patentable. 184 Since Chakrabarty, life forms are patent-
179 Susan B. Anthony, Marriage and Maternity, THE REVOLUTION, July 8, 1869, at 4,
reprinted in "MAN'S INHUMANITY TO WOMAN, MAKES COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE": THE
EARLY FEMINIST CASE AGAINST ABORTION 24 (Mary Krane Derr ed., 1991).
180 The sisters embraced "free love, spiritualism, radical labor politics, suffragism,
and free speech." BRODIE, supra note 142, at 273. In May 1872, Woodhull announced
her candidacy for the American presidency, becoming the first female to run for Pres-
ident. Id. She chose abolitionist Frederick Douglass as her vice-presidential running-
mate. Id.
181 Victoria Woodhull & Tennessee Claflin, The Slaughter of the Innocents, WOOD-
HULL & CLAFLIN'S WKLY.,June 20, 1874, at 9, reprinted in "MAN'S INHUMANITY TO WO-
MAN, MAKES COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE": THE EARLY FEMINIST CASE AGAINST ABORTION 37
(Mary Krane Derr ed., 1991).
182 Id.
183 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
184 As an exception, patents were generally granted to cell lines. In Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme
Court stated, "Human cell lines are patentable because '[ilong term adaptation and
growth of human tissues and cells in culture is difficult-often considered an art.'"
Id. at 492-93 (quoting U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Devel-
opments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells 33 (1987)).
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able if created by genetic or artificial manipulation."'," The
Chakrabary Court stated that "anything under the sun that is made by
man" can be patented.'
8 6
With those words, the Court made an absolute statement, pre-
sumably exempting nothing. Human beings would seem to fall within
the Court's holding. Human embryos can be man-made through ge-
netic manipulation. 18 7 Increasingly, embryologists manipulate em-
bryos by adding or removing genes.1 88 Many people fear that parents
will soon be able to create "perfect" babies through specific embryo
creation. '8 9 Each of those specifically-created embryos would seem-
ingly satisfy the Chakrabarty requirements for patentability.
Although the Court used absolutist language, the PTO found an
exemption. 191 In 1987, the PTO stated that "[a] claim directed to or
including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be
patentable subject matter" because "[t]he grant of a limited, but ex-
clusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitu-
tion."'' The PTO did not state its grounds for concluding that the
Constitution forbids granting such patents. 19 2 Commentators have
185 Mark Jagels, Note, Dr. Moreau Has Left the Island: Dealing with Human-Animal
Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 115, 128 (2000).
186 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Committee Reports on the Patent Act
of 1952, S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
187 See, e.g., Paul Hanna, Note, Recognizing the Need for Unifonn International Regula-
tion of Developing Biotechnology: A Focus on Genetic Experimentation, 24 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 87, 91 (2002).
188 See, e.g., May Mon Post, Note, Human Cloning: New Hope, New Implications, New
Challenges, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 171, 184 (2001).
189 Hanna, supra note 187, at 94; see also Raymond R. Coletta, Biotechnology and the
Creation of Ethics, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 89, 98-99 (2000) (discussing the ethical
problems created by gene manipulation).
190 See Kevin D. DeBr6, Note, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating
Slaves or Enslaving Science, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221, 251 & n.177 (1989).
191 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, PTO Policy on Patenting of Animals (Apr. 7, 1987),
reprinted in U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE 93 (1990).
192 See id. In a recent rejection notice of a patent, the PTO "appears to concede
that it has little or no legal authority" to prevent the patenting of human embryos.
Zitner, supra note 12. Six years ago, Jeremy Rifkin and Stuart Newman submitted to
the PTO a patent application for a "humouse," an animal-human hybrid. Id. In his
patent, Newman stated that he could create a humouse by injecting a human embryo
with embryonic cells from a mouse. Id. Rifkin and Newman submitted the patent to
force the government to establish a firm position on the patenting of human em-
bryos. Id. At first the PTO rejected the application because it "embraces a human
being," stating that human beings cannot be patented. Id. When Rifkin and Newman
asked the PTO to identify a law prohibiting human embryo patents, the PTO stated
that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited such patents. Id. However, in its most
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presumed that the PTO based its decision on the Thirteenth
Amendment. 1
9 3
Many commentators have criticized the PTO's conclusion,9 4 ar-
guing that the PTO decision misinterprets the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 9 5 According to such commentators, if an embryo meets the
statutory requirements, the PTO should grant a patent right.'9 6 How-
ever, even assuming the satisfaction of the patent requirements, the
PTO's position is correct: the Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit
the patenting of a human embryo. The Thirteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition of slavery would supercede the Patent Clause's allowance of
patents.
A patent gives its holder a property interest in the patented
item.'9 7 The holder has the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the
patented item.' 98 He can exclude all others from making, using, or
selling the item.'9 9 This right to exclude others is "the essence of a
patent grant. 2 '10 Although the holder receives the exclusive right to
make, use, or sell the item, another law may forbid the patent holder
from exercising his right of exclusion. In other words, the holder re-
ceives the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the item if the law allows
the making, using, or selling of such an item.2 11 For example, phar-
maceutical companies often obtain patents on drugs before having
obtained the approval of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to
sell the drugs.
Some have argued that because a patent does not give its holder
the affirmative right to make, use, or sell the patented item, a patent
on a human being would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
20 2
After comparing the patenting of pharmaceutical drugs with the pat-
enting of human beings, law professor Dan Burk argued that the pat-
recent rejection of the humouse application, the PTO did notjustify its position with
the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. Rather, the PTO stated that neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court had spoken on the issue of human embryo patents. Id. The PTO
continued, "In the absence of clear legislative intent and guidance from the courts, it
is incumbent on the office to proceed cautiously." Id.
193 DeBr6, supra note 190, at 228.
194 See, e.g., id. passim (arguing that granting patent rights in human beings does
not violate the Constitution).
195 Burk, supra note 60, at 1647-50.
196 Id. at 1648.
197 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
198 Id. § 154.
199 Id.
200 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
201 Fishman, supra note 140, at 468.
202 Burk, supra note 60, at 1647-48.
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enting of human beings would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment
because the right to prevent others from making, using, or selling an-
other human being does not "mean that the patent holder could im-
press the patented person into servitude or bondage."2°3
That argument misconstrues the Thirteenth Amendment. First,
the argument interprets the Thirteenth Amendment as forbidding
forced, physical servitude or bondage. As shown in Part IV, however,
the Thirteenth Amendment forbids chattelism, or the holding of
property in man. Suppose after the war, a slave owner said to his
slaves, "You are still my property; but, I have decided to give you the
physical freedom to do as you wish." Even if a slave owner had
granted his slaves such freedom, by retaining ownership of the slaves,
the slave owner would violate the Thirteenth Amendment
nonetheless.
Yet, Burk argues that the Thirteenth Amendment allows a prop-
erty right in human beings as long as the exercise of that right does
not restrict the physical freedom of the patented human being. While
practically it would seem that a human being is not enslaved if his
owner cannot require physical servitude, formally, the human being is
enslaved because another person owns him. 2114 A patent bestows upon
the patent holder a property right in the patented invention: the right
to exclude others from the manufacture, use, or sale of the invention.
Although a patent is the right to exclude, that right is not a property
right apart from the invention. According to the Supreme Court, the
right to exclude is "the hallmark of a protected property interest" and
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property."2 115 The "essence of all property" is
the right to exclude. 2116 Therefore, a patent on a human being be-
stows a property right in the patented human being.
203 Id. at 1648.
204 Even assuming that the Thirteenth Amendment allows "passive" ownership of
human beings, what would be the sense in granting a patent that could never be exer-
cised? In the pharmaceutical scenario, the government grants a patent that could be
exercised because the Constitution does not forbid the making of drugs. In the
human-being scenario, the government grants a patent that cannot be exercised be-
cause the Constitution forbids, at a minimum, the "active" ownership of human be-
ings. The Framers almost certainly could not have intended the patent system to
grant patents that could never be exercised constitutionally.
205 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
673 (1999).
206 In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]he essence of all
property is the right to exclude"); see also Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d
1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing patent rights as "rights in an invention" (em-
phasis added)); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
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The right to manufacture would give the patent holder the right
to reproduce, or clone, the human being and to exclude others from
cloning that human being. Presently, cloning is legal in the United
States. Therefore, each human being in the United States presumably
"owns" the right to clone himself and to exclude others from cloning
himself.20 7 A patent in a human being takes that right away from the
human being and gives it to the patent holder, thus giving the patent
holder ownership in the human being.
The right to use would give the patent holder the right to control
the human being's activities and to prevent others from interacting
with the human being.208 Presently, each human being in the United
States has the right to control his actions and interaction with others.
Each human being has the right to "use" himself as he sees fit and the
right to exclude others from using him. As with the right to manufac-
ture, a patent in a human being takes the right to use away from a
human being and gives it to the patent holder, thus giving the holder
ownership in a human being.
The right to sell would give the patent holder the right to con-
tract out, or sell, the human being and his services.2~19 The Thirteenth
Amendment forbids the sale of humans without their consent. There-
fore, the patent gives a right forbidden by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Furthermore, the patent gives the patent holder the right to
forbid the patented human being from "selling" himself (i.e., con-
tracting for employment), thus taking the human being's right to
"sell" himself and giving it to the patent holder.
Second, Burk's argument does not consider that human beings
exist prenatally. Burk does not consider that human embryos are
human beings. Presently, the manufacturing, use, and sale of human
embryos occurs in the United States.211) Few states prohibit such ac-
tions. Practically, a human embryo patent would give its patent
1983) (stating that "the right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of
the concept of property").
207 Indeed, some commentators have argued that cloning is a fundamental right.
See e.g., Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Human Cloning. Is There a Funda-
mental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1998) (arguing that cloning is a fundamental
right); Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2348
(1998) (same).
208 Fishman, supra note 140, at 475-76.
209 See Walker, supra note 141, at 111.
210 The manufacture, use, and sale of human embryos is not legal for all purposes
in all states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 2000) (prohibiting sale of em-
bryos); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2000) (prohibiting the sale of human em-
bryos for any purpose and prohibiting the manufacture and use of embryos any
purpose except full development of the human embryo).
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holder the right to prevent others from making, using, and selling
similar human embryos.
Third, Burk's argument would make a human embryo patent
meaningless. In the FDA example mentioned above, although the
patent does not give the holder the right to make, use, or sell the
drug, the law does give the patent holder the potential to do so. The
manufacturing, use, and sale of drugs within the United States is gen-
erally legal. Once the FDA approves the drug, the patent holder can
make, use, or sell the drug, and, consequently, exercise his patent
rights. The manufacturing, 21' use, and sale of human beings is un-
constitutional within the United States. Although some states allow
the manufacturing, use, and sale of human embryos within their bor-
ders, the Thirteenth Amendment expressly prohibits such actions.
Therefore, because a human embryo is a human being, a human em-
bryo patent should have no legal use in the United States. Under the
Thirteenth Amendment, a human-embryo patent holder would never
have an opportunity to exercise his right to prevent others from man-
ufacturing, using, and selling his patented human being.
The Thirteenth Amendment forbids ownership of human beings.
A human embryo is a human being. A patent of a human being
grants the patent holder ownership of the right to exclusive manufac-
ture, use, and sale of a human being. The rights to manufacture, use,
and sell a human being are rights to own a human being. Because a
patent in a human being grants ownership of a human being, the pat-
ent violates the Thirteenth Amendment. Therefore, because a
human embryo is a human being, the Thirteenth Amendment forbids
the government from granting patents on human embryos.
CONCILUSION
The debate over the proper uses and boundaries of science inten-
sifies increasingly as biotechnology advances into new, unknown fron-
tiers. With recent advancements in cloning and stem-cell research,
the patenting of human embryos has been propelled to the forefront
of the debate. The public must be careful not to be swept away by the
predicted gloom or promise of potential scientific advancements.
Before formulating new laws to deal with new technology, legislators,
executives, and judges alike should first consider existing law and its
possible application to the technology.
Although some have proposed new regulations for the patenting
of human embryos, the Constitution has a regulation in place already:
211 "Manufacturing" alone is legal within the United States. Generally, however,
people find it distasteful to refer to making embryos as manufacturing human beings.
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the Thirteenth Amendment. Was the patenting of human embryos
the specific problem the framers were concerned with when passing
the Thirteenth Amendment? No. Is the patenting of human embryos
an illustration of the general problem with which the framers were
concerned? Yes. Although the framers of the Amendment likely
never considered its application to human embryos specifically, the
framers did consider its application to human beings generally. To
provide human beings protection beyond the immediate problem of
black slavery, the framers drafted the Amendment in general terms,
with language broad enough to encompass every living human being.
Because the Amendment embraces the entire human race, the
Amendment applies to the patenting of human embryos. Further-
more, the Amendment's manifest applicability shows that the patent-
ing of human embryos would violate the very principles that animated
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Patent Clause permits the government to grant a property
right in certain things; however, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
the property ownership in human beings. An embryo is a human be-
ing. Therefore, a patent of a human embryo grants a property right a
human being. Because the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the
ownership of human beings, the PTO cannot constitutionally grant
patents for human embryos.
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